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Solomon Islands Defence Force: Who is the Enemy?
A few days after assuming office in June last year, the Solomon Islands prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, announced his government's intention to establish a national defence force. He proposed that the defence force "will oversee national security and in due course establish an air surveillance unit." "Members of the two militant groups fighting in Guadalcanal could soon be working along [side] each other if the government's plan to have a defence force materialises," said the prime minister.
He said the idea behind establishing a defence force is to rehabilitate militants: "to bring these young people who are now used to holding guns back to normal life. After the process of disarmament, members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement and Malaita Eagle Force could be drafted into a military academy. They could be trained, not only in military combat, but also in manual skills to be electricians, carpenters and constructors so that they could be effective citizens of the country when needed."
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This proposal is premised on a number of assumptions:
- First, that the Solomon Islands crisis emerged as a consequence of the
absence of a national defence force. It implies that if Solomon Islands had
had a defence force the crisis would not have occurred.
-Secondly, that a defence force could resolve the crisis.
-Thirdly, that Solomon Islands has the financial ability to establish and
maintain a defence force.
These assumptions are problematic and demonstrate a lack of understanding of the underlying causes of the Solomons crisis. Furthermore, they ignore lessons from the military coups in Fiji (1987 and 2000), the civil and military uprisings in Papua New Guinea, the 1996 kidnapping of the Vanuatu¹s president by members of the country¹s paramilitary force, and the participation of members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police in the overthrow of a civilian government in Solomon Islands on June 5, 2000.
Does Solomon Islands
need a defence force?
National military forces are created and sustained generally for two
purposes. The first is to defend the state from external aggression. This
raises the question about who are the likely external aggressors against
Solomon Islands?
During the height of the Bougainville crisis, the Mamaloni government purchased US$4 million worth of arms because it perceived Papua New Guinea as a potential threat. This was largely a reaction to an incident on 12 September, 1992 when members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force made incursions into the Western Solomons, killed a man and a pregnant woman, and wounded a small girl.
Despite this, it is unlikely that the state of Papua New Guinea would invade Solomon Islands. This is especially so given the enormity of its internal problems, and because such an invasion would attract international condemnation.
Secondly, defence forces are often established to defend the state from internal revolt. Here, military forces, in many instances, play a reactionary role. They do not address the underlying causes. Experiences elsewhere have indicated that defence forces rarely (if ever) contribute to ending social unrest. In fact, in the Pacific Islands it is those countries with some form of armed military forces that have, so far, experienced the greatest social unrest: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji. All these countries have a relatively high ratio of population to police or military force compared to New Zealand and Australia .
It should be noted that the Solomons¹ crisis emerged, not because of the absence of a defence force. Rather, it was because of issues relating to land, development, unequal and inequitable distribution of national wealth, rapid urbanisation, poor public sector management, unemployment, poor leadership, and the failure of successive governments to address these issues.
Melanesia's experiences in the past 14 years have shown that defence forces constitute a greater danger than the threats they are supposed to counter. Hence, one could argue that Solomon Islands does not need a defence force. A well trained and professional police force that works closely with the communities could do an effective job in maintaining law and order.
Defence for whom?
Many times those in positions of authority legitimise their push for the
establishment of a military by arguing that it will defend citizens against
agression. But, do military forces always defend citizens? No!
In Solomon Islands, the only people ever killed by the state have been
Solomon Islanders. Hence, it is unlikely that a defence force will defend
the interests of ordinary people. This is because firstly, any such a force
will be so divided along island identities that it would be nearly
impossible to achieve institutional loyalty.
Secondly, the recruitment of "former" militants will exacerbate the problem. Most of these people lack the educational background, discipline and character to serve with loyalty. In fact, many of them will join to defend themselves from social reprisal for the crimes they committed.
Thirdly, one cannot assume the impartiality of the police. A defence force will likely be controlled by those police officers who participated in the illegal overthrow of a civilian government on 5 June, 2000. Hence, any foreign government and organisations assisting in the establishment of a defence force will be seen as colluding with the coup-makers; one of the parties in the Solomons crisis. In the long run, this is a time bomb.
Rather than defending ordinary citizens, most probably a military force will become an instrument for defending the interests of those in government (and their cronies); those who became wealthy from the crisis. It will be an undisciplined, disloyal and corrupt force that will cultivate coup-makers; an instrument for the suppression of ordinary citizens.
Following the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA), the government embarked on an aggressive recruitment of "former" militants as Special Constables.
This is not provided for under the TPA. Part Two [1](a) of the TPA provides for police officers who assisted both the MEF and IFM to be re-engaged in the RSIP. This, however, is "subject to the powers of appointment vested in the Police and Prison Services Commission." No part of the document provides for the recruitment of former militants as either special constables or members of a military force.
Hence, the Sogovare government¹s insistence to establish a defence force will only serve the interests of those who benefit from the existing status quo.
Some people have argued that a defence force is needed to capture the notorious Harold Keke. I am of the opinion that the problems in Guadalcanal (and elsewhere) could be resolved without a defence force. Arms and armies may be able to kill Harold Keke, but they will not take away the reasons for the crisis. Instead they will create more enemies, more wars and more problems. Capturing and killing are not resolutions.
Can the Solomons afford it?
The answer to this question is NO! Economically, socially and politically
Solomon Islands cannot afford to have a military force.
Economically, the country is in the verge of bankruptcy. Solomon Islands now has a debt of about SI$1 billion; nearly twice the national budget. Central government debt at the end of 2000 reached about 75 percent of GDP; about 60 percent of this is in external debt.
Gross external reserves were about US$6.5 million at the end of 2000, sufficient to cover only about two months of imports. The external position of the country remains fragile. The problem is exacerbated by the closure of major industries such as palm oil, Gold Ridge mine and the Solomon Taiyo cannery in Noro.
In such a situation the government cannot afford to create and sustain a defence force.
What does Solomons need?
What Solomon Islands needs is not a defence force. Rather, the country needs
good leadership, strong socio-economic development that will provide people
with hope, sustainable employment, and access to education and health
services. Government efforts should be channelled towards addressing the
underlying causes of the Solomon Islands crisis.
With regards to the police, an option is to make all existing police officers redundant and start a new recruitment and training exercise aimed at creating a new culture in the institution. The current police force can no longer be assumed to be impartial and loyal to the state.
Solomon Islands¹ enemies, therefore, are not militaristic in nature. Rather, they include socio-economic issues such as poverty, illiteracy, poor health, economic mismanagement, poor leadership, corruption, and poor policies.
Furthermore, young people do not need to join a military force to be rehabilitated. What they need is access to education, health services, quality counselling and an environment that will give them the skills to contribute productively to the country.
-Solomon Islands writer Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka lectures at the University of the South Pacific.
