Cover Story
SPECIAL REPORT: Explaining the Solomons' Collapse
The Absence Of A Functioning Government Keeps The Solomon Islands Mired In Violence
I looked at his blood as it dripped down my palms and onto the ground below. Tears rolled down my cheeks. On a stretcher, wrapped in a blood-soaked cloth, was the body of a wantok, friend, and fellow Isatabu Freedom Movement leader. I stared at the motionless bundle and wept. My emotions overtook me. I embraced the bundle and wept. This was the body of Selwyn Saki, another casualty of Solomon Islands social unrest.
A wave of emotions engulfed me. I had gone to Honiara to make peace, not war. But, the sight of a wantok who had been brutally murdered was not easy to deal with.
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That evening, when we took his body to his village, I knew there could be trouble; violence could erupt again. I felt an enormous responsibility on my shoulders. A few minutes after we arrived and the body was laid in his house, I was asked to speak. In the midst of my anger, fears and sorrow I heard myself saying that the only way forward is peace.
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What saddens and angers me is that months after this incident, his killers have not been apprehended, even though many people have a fair idea of who they were. The investigation into his killing has stalled because those in positions of power have refused to let justice prevail.
It was partly because of this situation that my Guadalcanal wantoks took up arms in the first place. They no longer had faith in the state. If the Solomon Islands state is to survive, we must give people reasons to believe in it.
The Guadalcanal uprising started in late 1998 when some Guadalcanal men, claiming to represent the interests of the island’s indigenous people, terrorized and chased settlers from other islands in areas around the national capital, Honiara. The group now calls itself the Isatabu Freedom Movement. Soon, civilian Guadalcanal people in Honiara were being intimidated by a Malaita militant group that calls itself the Malaita Eagle Force.
On 5 June 2000, the Malaita Eagle Force staged a de facto coup and deposed the government. Open confrontations between the militant groups intensified in areas around Honiara. The MEF took control of Honiara while the IFM had control of the rest of Guadalcanal. Despite numerous attempts at resolving the crisis, violent incidents and killings continue.
In large part the violence continues because the government lacks the capacity to address the underlying issues. The weakness of the Solomon Islands state has been a major hindrance to the country’s peace process. The state has been unable to maintain social control, ensure compliance with laws, preserve stability, provide basic services or control the national economy. This weakness has been exacerbated by the crisis that began in late 1998 and was followed on 5 June 2000 by the coup that replaced the legitimate government and has contributed to the failure of the peace process.
With the country’s deteriorating economic situation in the 1980s and 1990s, the government accumulated debts well beyond its ability to repay. In this period also, substantial fraud and theft by public servants occurred, while huge amounts of money were given to members of parliament through the Constituency Development Fund. In consequence, a majority of the country’s population suffered; a few became very rich at the expense of nation-wide development.
On Guadalcanal, issues of migration and settlement were compounded because of the rapid growth of Honiara and the expansion of squatter settlements in its vicinity. The people of Guadalcanal had long been concerned with the migration of other Solomon Islanders to their island. Increasingly in the late 1980s and 1990s Honiara became a town that reflected the country’s national problems.
Another 1990s phenomenon was the in-migration of Bougainvilleans during that island’s 10-year war for independence from Papua New Guinea.
Although the 2000 Townsville Peace Agreement managed to stop overt violence between the two militant groups, the agreement had numerous weaknesses. First, it assumed that the parties to the conflict were strong cohesive entities. This was not entirely the case. Second, the agreement attempted to address more issues than were within the power of the parties involved. Third, the issues of justice and accountability were ignored. Fourth, participation in the Townsville Peace Agreement was limited to the two militant groups and the government. Other members of the Solomon Islands community—churches, nongovernmental organizations, women, and other civil society groups—were denied representation. And, finally, implementation was difficult because state institutions had collapsed.
The police force is unable to function coherently because of divisions along ethnic lines, self-interest and the failure to discipline police officers who were involved in criminal activities. Other parts of the government were hijacked and used as an instrument to serve personal and non-state interests. During the crisis many individuals dipped into the state coffers.
If the state is so weak, how could it contribute effectively to the peace process?
It cannot contribute to peace unaided. In the Solomon Islands case, the continuing assumption that the state can carry out the peace process is problematic. With institutions such as the police thoroughly compromised, NGOs and other civil society representatives cannot rely on them for protection. Despite its huge potential moral power, civil society is very vulnerable in the Solomon Islands.
The peace process is further complicated by the militarization of society, especially young men and youth. Since the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement, guns have been used in demands for compensation, threats to state officials, killings and other criminal activities. The weakness of the state leaves it in no position to address this law and order problem.
At present, one of the most immediate security issues for the Solomon Islands is disarmament. Any process of disarmament must be both physical and psychological, getting rid not only of the guns in people’s hands but also of the guns in their heads. As long as there are armed militants with no hope of gainful employment, the peace process will remain at risk.
Given that the state is weak, it is unlikely that it will effectively lead the peace process. Current attempts at strengthening the state will only strengthen the domination of the state by those who now control it. If foreign governments and international institutions are to contribute to long-term peace, their assistance must be cautiously administered.
Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that moneys provided are spent for the intended purpose and properly accounted for. Given that civil society groups are continually being intimidated, it is unlikely that they will contribute effectively to conflict resolution. For real conflict resolution to occur and true peace to be achieved, justice must be served, justice in the broad sense to include not only retributive justice, but restorative justice as well. As long as there is no justice in the Solomon Islands, peace will be a farfetched idea.
Map © David Stanley http://www.southpacific.org
