Analysis
U.S. Redux
Washington Needs To Recalculate Its Role In The North Pacific—Again
We are approaching a significant turning point in the role of the United States of America in the Pacific Islands. The new year will mark the 59th anniversary of an active U.S. presence in the region, not counting Washington’s forays into Hawaii, Guam and American Samoa late in the 19th century—or the antics of whalers before then. Of course, in 1944, the U.S. role was defined by bloody battles fought in an arc that ran from New Guinea to the Marianas and on to Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
For most of the past 59 years, the battles fought in places such as Tarawa, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Saipan shaped Washington’s perspective of the Pacific Islands. In that era, the region held considerable strategic value, if only to deny the Soviet Union a toehold in far-flung Island ports.
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The end of the Cold War effectively ended Washington’s interest in denying the Pacific Islands to a competing power. The lack of a Soviet threat pretty much ended any consistent, broad-based U.S. interest in the region. That transition also coincided with the passing of U.S. leadership that had any direct involvement in the Pacific Islands, particularly as servicemen during World War II.
The lack of focus in Washington on Pacific Islands issues, never strong even in the best of times, was evident in the most recent negotiations for new Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. The U.S. began talking openly of ending direct grants to these nations, which were once its wards as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The concept of separate trust funds for each nation, to be funded primarily by Washington over the next 20 years, is quite remarkable. At the end of the period, so the theory goes, each government will have a corpus large enough to help sustain national governments without any direct grants from Washington.
In theory, it is a great idea. There is a tangible sense of nationalism in these young countries that wasn’t as sharply defined 15 years ago, when they began the first Compacts of Free Association. There is also a sea change taking place in the leadership of both countries. The old guard that brought both Pacific Islands nations to independence is all but gone. A number of today’s mid- and high-level bureaucrats, not to mention a few key elected officials, are more sophisticated and technically able than their predecessors.
Given that, the ability to plan 20 years out for the day when Washington no longer funds national governments is good. The reality is that, while the U.S. role in that part of the Pacific will evolve, Washington will remain significantly engaged in the region. There are a number of reasons driving that fact.
The first is the reality of how close the current relationship is between Washington and Majuro and Palikir. The U.S. ambassador to the FSM, Larry Dinger, tells of being informed shortly after he arrived on post that 600 U.S. federal officials came through Pohnpei in a recent calendar year on official business. He didn’t believe the number, and had the U.S. embassy staff recheck the numbers. Sure enough, the number was 600.
That’s a lot of federal programs represented in those 600 bureaucrats who made the long journey to the FSM. Is it realistic to expect the FSM or Marshall Islands to be able to replace much of that federal assistance with locally generated talent or programming? Not likely.
The second is the reality of Washington’s moral commitment to the region, and in particular the Marshall Islands. The fact that the U.S. used the Marshall Islands for nuclear weapons testing for nearly 15 years, and that a number of local communities were either relocated or affected by radioactive fallout, doesn’t change, even if U.S. grant aid ends in 20 years. This is not to suggest that U.S. lawmakers must continue to pay in perpetuity for the sins of their fathers, but Washington cannot end its moral obligations simply by agreeing to fund a national trust for 20 years.
Finally, there is the reality of a fast-changing world. The Soviet Union may be gone, but international threats have not subsided. And these days, political upheaval, bloodshed and strife are found in the Pacific Islands themselves: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, to name the most obvious.
In an unsettled environment, U.S. policy makers are asking themselves: What about the role of Guam and Saipan in U.S. strategic planning if the American military is forced to withdraw from Okinawa? How important will the islands between Hawaii and Asia become if North Korea launches missiles into Japan? And will the ripples become tsunamis across Oceania if Indonesia erupts in widespread religious-based terrorism and ethnic bloodshed?
Before we assume that Washington is indeed preparing its financial exit strategy in the North Pacific, it might be wise to first consider the other currents flowing through the region. Washington may find that the far-flung islands of the Pacific, so long off the front pages of history, may again have significant strategic value. And if that happens, what we’re seeing now will simply be a new chapter in U.S.-regional relations, not the beginning of the end of U.S. financial involvement in the Pacific Islands, as some in Washington seem so keen on insisting.
