U.S. - Pacific
From Denial to Development
An Evolving American Role in Micronesia
Historically, the American role in the Micronesian region has been dictated by its perceived national security interests. After the Spanish-American War, the United States took only Guam as the spoil of war and allowed Spain to sell the Caroline Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands to Germany. The United States was torn between its traditional anti-colonial stance and the need to acquire new colonies as encouraged by the hawks in Washington. In the end, a compromise was reached where America would acquire only Guam because it straddles the line of communication with the Philippines.
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The United States strenuously objected to Japan’s acquisition of Micronesia through the League of Nations Mandate after WWI. The Americans had argued that the islands should be demilitarized and that the underwater cable terminal in Yap should be accessible to other countries for commercial purposes. But the United States was limited in what it could do because it was not in the League of Nations. In spite of its reservation, the United States formally recognized Japan’s control of Micronesia in 1922.
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America fought some of the bloodiest battles of WWII in Micronesia. This experience convinced Washington that control of the islands was necessary for the overall strategic interest of the United States in the Pacific. This view was reflected in the establishment of the former Japanese Mandated islands as the only strategic trusteeship after the war. The United States had fashioned this unique trusteeship to meet its own national security interest in the Pacific and had ensured its approval in the Security Council of the United Nations.
The American strategic interest has been expressed in three forms: (1) active military use of islands in Micronesia like the current utilization of Kwajalein for missile testing; use of Bikini and Enewetak for atomic bomb testing sites in the 1940s and 1950s; and the use of Saipan as a CIA training base in the ’50s and ’60s; (2) ensuring rights for future military use; and (3) to retain “denial”—the power to deny other countries the use of Micronesia for military purposes.
These interests are the cornerstones of the Compact treaties with the FSM, Palau, and the Marshall Islands; and the commonwealth covenants with the Northern Mariana Islands. In the Marshall Islands, the United States retains the active use of Kwajalein as a missile testing range. In Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, sizeable parcels of land are designated for exclusive and joint military use. In the FSM, no land is specifically designated for military use, but the United States might exercise that option as long as the security and defense provision of the Compact remains in effect. In addition to the Compact, a little-known treaty with the Freely Associated States accords the United States perpetual denial right.
This perceived security interest was valid in the twentieth century, dominated as it was by Cold War politics. In this century, though, the United States is the sole superpower and its security interest and role in the Micronesian region are different. The American posture in the negotiation for Compact II suggests that its security interest in the region is waning.
This does not mean that the United States would disengage itself completely. It might mean the scaling back or termination of some U.S. Federal programs operating in the three Freely-Associated States. Washington and the various Micronesian governments need to evaluate the applicability of these federal programs to the local social, economic and political settings. These programs have clearly altered the cultural landscape in the American-affiliated Micronesian states and have become the engine driving the Americanization of Micronesian societies in the Freely Associated States.
In the post-9/11 world, the United States security interest and role in Micronesia must take on a new meaning and a different approach. Instead of emphasizing troop basing and perpetual denial right, Washington should focus its attention and funding on building local capacity and training for law enforcement and immigration personnel to ensure that the region is not used for money laundering and terrorist activities.
And Washington must go beyond its Compact commitments. It should seriously consider granting most favored nation status to the Freely Associated States to encourage foreign investment and development of local manufacturing capacity. These developments are necessary prerequisites for the establishment of trade relationships with the United States and other countries. Needless to say, trade will increase national wealth and decrease dependency on Washington handouts. This policy will be good for the stability of the region and it will allow the United States to gracefully exit in 20 years.
