Strategic Denial Redux?

The funding provisions of the Compacts of Free Association for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia expire on Sept. 30. Federal officials and lobbyists for the islands are feverishly working Congress to ensure passage of the newly negotiated arrangements commonly referred to as Compact II.

Most of the discussion has been about the funding arrangements, but there has also been a new tone about the strategic value of these two island nations. During the height of the Cold War, and in the negotiation of the original Compacts in the 1980s, the term "strategic denial" was used to explain the value of the islands. The U.S. was given the right to deny to any other power over one million square miles of ocean in the middle of the Micronesian region along with a "defense veto."

Strategic denial has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Micronesia since the end of World War II. Along with access to Kwajalein, defense planners received all that they wanted from the Compacts. When the Cold War ended, the strategic stock value of the Islands declined.

Last year, a General Accounting Office Study reported that "continued access to U.S. facilities on Kwajalein Atoll is the only compelling U.S. defense or security interest." The report also claimed that there is no consensus on the value of "strategic denial" and that its effect was "overstated." Some analysts in the State and Defense Departments saw strategic denial as irrelevant in today's environment.

This denial of strategic denial confirmed that the region's strategic stock had plummeted to new lows. But the tone of Defense officials this year has been decidedly different. In statements during Compact hearings before Congress, the GAO report now seems irrelevant to new realities. Citing the changed international circumstances since 9/11 and the Pentagon's desire to transform the military, the compact areas are being framed in a new light.

Just last month, Peter Brookes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, delivered the new, upbeat version of Micronesia's strategic stock portfolio. Referring to the Quadrennial Defense Review, Brookes hinted that Micronesia may be used more as the U.S. reorients its military posture in Asia. The Navy will increase carrier battle group presence, homeport three or four surface combatants and several guided cruise missile submarines in the region. The Marines are considering areas for conducting training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific.

This could benefit Guam tremendously. The U.S. territory can house these new assets. But where do the compact states fit in? Micronesia is referred to as a possibility for "en route infrastructure for refueling and logistics." It sounds like Micronesia may be going from an area to deny to others, to an area of specific military activity. Finally, we may be moving from strategic denial to strategic affirmation.

Or are we? Is this an example of Defense overstatement in order to increase support and attention to Compact II, which is under a Sept. 30 deadline? When interest in distant islands starts to wane, a quick reference to strategic value and necessity in a very general way can always be of assistance.

If the Sept. 30 deadline is met and we never hear from Defense Department officials again on the topic, then "denial" is still the operative term. We will have to watch defense budgets and official U.S. responses to offers by the Federated States of Micronesia for possible military sites and military maneuvering.

Whether denial or affirmation is more appropriate, it is clear that the desire to maintain access to Kwajalein remains strong. The new arrangements allow the U.S. access until 2066. Missile defense programs continue to drive the new attention to Kwajalein. It remains the cornerstone of U.S. interests in the freely associated states in Micronesia.

Robert A. Underwood is Guam's former U.S. Congressional delegate.