Japan in the Pacific
What Role For Tokyo?
Japan Cautiously Seeks To Expand Its Influence
It has been said that Australia is a “Big Brother” to much of the South Pacific. If that’s the case, who might Japan be?
The Japanese government prefers to think of itself as a good friend. And for some time now, Japan has been on a mission to make a cordial friendship with the Pacific Islands an even closer one.
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Over the years, it has extended significant amounts of government aid to the region. Japan’s total aid budget has declined since the end of the 1990s, but the government says that it remains the second-largest donor after Australia to Pacific Islands countries, and it is the biggest provider of assistance to several individual nations. Total aid came to just over US$100 million in 2001.
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Japan has demonstrated its commitment in other ways. In 1997, for example, it hosted its first-ever summit with regional leaders. Since then, Japan has held the event, now widely known as the PALM Summit, once every three years. The most recent was in Okinawa in May.
The question is: Why is Japan so keen on building bonds in the Pacific? Undoubtedly, having more, rather than fewer, allies is to any country’s advantage. But as observers are quick to point out, Japan—unlike Australia or the United States in the Western Pacific—does not have any pressing security concerns in the area. And, although both sides make much of their historic ties and a shared heritage as island countries, geographically speaking, the Pacific Islands do not fall within Japan’s natural sphere of influence.
So what does Japan stand to gain from pursuing a campaign of camaraderie in the Pacific? Or, to put it more bluntly, why does it care?
The most obvious reason is economic—primarily, Japan’s decades-long dependence on the area’s tuna resources. Maintaining continued access for its fishing fleets is a top priority. Japan also has interests in the Pacific’s natural resources and tourism industry.
But ensuring the smooth flow of commerce is not Japan’s only motivation. Observers agree that in recent years, the Japanese government has taken a closer look at the diplomatic benefits of having a more prominent profile in the region.
The potential payoff is twofold, with one outcome being smoother bilateral relations with the Pacific Islands. In addition, experts see a link between Japan’s movements in the Pacific and its broader foreign policy interests, particularly with regard to how demonstrating initiative and leadership in the Pacific could enhance Japan’s stature in the international community.
For many years in the postwar era, fishing was Japan’s primary focus in the Pacific Islands. After defeat in World War II forced Japan into humiliating retreat from its former colonial empire, fishing fleets led the country’s first forays back into the region in the 1950s.
Today, tuna fishing remains one of Japan’s core interests in the region. Sandra Tarte, senior lecturer at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, notes that despite increasing competition from other countries, “Japan remains the largest distant-water fishing nation in the region,” and she reckons that approximately one-third of all fresh tuna consumed in Japan comes from the area’s waters.
Hiroshi Nakajima, senior executive director of the Tokyo-based Pacific Society, has been following Japan’s relations with the Pacific Island countries for over a quarter century. He says the reason for Tokyo’s change of stance was simple: The Japanese government realized that having staunch regional allies could yield valuable dividends in the international arena.
“In the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan’s foreign policy toward the Pacific Islands was focused on achieving smoother negotiations for Japanese fishing rights. But since the 1990s, Japan has stressed a friendly relationship in order to get voting support at the United Nations and other international organizations,” he says.
Kazuo Kodama, deputy director-general of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau and its Economic Cooperation Bureau, acknowledges the significance of this support, particularly with regard to Japan’s ongoing quest to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. (See our interview with Kodama.)
Now, at the start of the 21st century, some observers see another dynamic at work. This view positions the Pacific Islands as a kind of stage on which Japan can demonstrate its skills in diplomacy and leadership to the wider international community (which could help it at the UN) and also use regional initiatives to cement its alliances with the U. S. and other powers such as Australia.
“I think there’s an effort here by Japan to become a more visible player, and I think that has less to do with the specifics of policy issues than it has to do with Japan’s own ambitions to play a regional role in the Asia-Pacific more broadly,” says Sheila Smith, a fellow at the Honolulu’s East-West Center specializing in Japanese foreign policy and regional security.
Smith believes that this partly explains Japan’s decision to inaugurate the PALM Summit.
A more recent development is Japan’s emerging role in regional security initiatives, most notably the Australian-led, post-conflict reconstruction effort in the Solomon Islands. The issue was among the major topics discussed at this year’s PALM Summit.
A “Joint Action Plan” issued at the end of the two-day meeting included Tokyo’s pledge to contribute to the collection of small arms and light weapons in the Solomon Islands, as well as in Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. Additional commitments include aiding in the reconstruction of Honiara’s international airport and funding for a United Nations Development Program scheme for reintegrating former combatants into civilian society.
The Solomons issue came up again in July when Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Australian Prime Minister John Howard met in Tokyo. In a joint press conference, Koizumi made a point of expressing support for the Australian initiative, adding, “Japan shall extend its assistance as much as possible for the Solomon Islands as well.”
Japan’s involvement also comes amid a heightened global dialogue about security and stability issues in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001. Doing its part to enhance regional stability is one way Japan can contribute to the war on terrorism.
Domestic factors may be at work as well. Japan is in the midst of its most significant debate to date about the role of its military, and the related matter of a possible revision of its pacifist postwar Constitution. Amid tensions with North Korea, lawmakers have enacted historic defense legislation that makes it easier to deploy troops in the event Japan is attacked on its own territory.
In addition, the Japanese Diet passed a separate bill authorizing the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction. Continued volatility in Iraq has brought the mission into question. But if Japan does carry through, it would mark the largest postwar overseas deployment of its troops, and the first deployment of ground troops outside of UN peacekeeping operations.
Moves like these have fueled speculation that Japan could eventually scale down its longstanding dependence on U.S. military protection and assume a stronger security stance.
Still, the issue remains politically sensitive and any far-reaching amendments would be slow in coming.
“Japan is changing. It does have a larger security profile now than it did a generation ago,” says Roger Buckley, professor of political science at International Christian University in Tokyo. “But there are reservations. Japan is constrained by domestic opinion and by reservations within the region (because of its wartime military actions).”
Given these considerations, and the fact that Japan’s own security interests in the Pacific Islands are limited, Tokyo’s focus will continue to be to supplement other countries’ efforts, particularly in the areas of post-conflict reconstruction and “human security.”
“I think we will see Japan strengthen its support for regional security initiatives that aren’t connected to military might. At that level of involvement, the government would not face domestic criticism, nor would there be an outcry from other Asian nations,” says Kazuyoshi Ogawa, senior researcher at the Japan Institute for Pacific Studies.
Kodama at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs backs up this assessment. “In the case of the Pacific Island countries, we see a good example of Australia and New Zealand taking the lead.
Pres. George W. Bush referred to Australia once as the “sheriff” of the region. But it is a safe bet that Japan would not wish to be labeled the sheriff of any part of the Asia-Pacific. Tokyo, as it has stressed countless times, values its lower-key position as a close and trusted friend.
