Signing On With Uncle Sam

The largest-ever induction of Marshall Islanders into the U.S. Army took place in Majuro in early August, with 21 young people signing up to defend the United States of America. The significance of the ceremony accorded to the event-held as it was in the Nitijela (Parliament) chamber and attended by many leading elected and traditional leaders and members of the public-may in fact be a metaphor for the lack of definition by island leaders of their own governments' relationship to America in the post-Cold War world.

Are the U.S.-affiliated islands still merely outposts of America? Can they establish and define the meaning of their special relationship with America that is as much to their advantage as it is to Washington's? Finally, can island leaders use their special relationship with America to address immediate security needs-the creation of education and employment opportunities at home-to lure islanders back in much the same way as the promises of recruiters draw young islanders to the U.S. military?

Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Gerald Zackios, Deputy Asst. Secretary Randall Schriver, President Kessai Note. Photo: Giff Johnson

The strategic importance of the North Pacific was once clearly defined by the American need for "strategic denial"-denying access by the Soviet Union to the region. But since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s the Pentagon hasn't reformulated its strategic concept of the region, nor have Pacific Island revised their thinking.

"The North Pacific is incredibly important," says Robert Underwood, who served in Washington for 10 years as Guam's Congressman from 1992-2002, and who is a regular contributor to Pacific Magazine. "But that is not the same as 'critical.'"

Underwood argues that the "the whole way to look at the region has to be redefined. Governments in the region need to make it work to their advantage. But no one is doing it. What does it mean to say 'we're on board' (with the U.S.)? There is a need to define our own relationship to security. Don't let the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific do it for us."

The U.S. government has launched the process of redefining its defense posture in the Pacific. Randall Schriver, the deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific in the State Department, told Pacific Magazine that State is cooperating with the Department of Defense in a study of American force structure in the region.

"It's an overdue effort," he says. "We're well beyond the end of the Cold War." He noted the complex situation in Asia, particularly the potential flashpoints between China and Taiwan and on the Korean peninsula. "We're looking at it in a deliberate way," Schriver says of the force structure review. "In the 1990s, the U.S. was positioned in a way designed to deal with the old Cold War situation. Now we're addressing 21st century challenges."

Since September 11th, the U.S. government has been single mindedly focused on the war on terrorism, almost to the exclusion of all else. But that has yet to lead to a new American concept of the region's significance, other than opening the door to increasing levels of funding for anti-terrorism and giving islands a hook with which to gain Washington's attention.

"Pacific Islands have emerged to be of greater interest after 9/11," Schriver says. "With the focus on counter-terrorism, the region will get attention because we can't afford to ignore it. We can't ignore one-third of the world."

But what, precisely, does that mean for the Pacific Islands and in particular, the U.S.-affiliated islands, which have been struggling to find their new niche in the post-Cold War scene? Most leaders in the U.S.-affiliated Pacific are conflicted by the irony that their wholehearted and overwhelming support of the U.S. has created an increasingly apparent one-way relationship with Washington.

They vote with the U.S. nearly 100 percent of the time at the United Nations, they're part of the "Coalition of the Willing," their citizens are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply put, these Pacific Island nations define the meaning of being "on board" with the U.S. in its war on terror.

While some cynics put that loyalty to the U.S. as a matter of simple checkbook politics-after all, Washington underwrites the economies in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands-it is far too simplistic a view, one that does not do justice to the depth of the relationship that has developed at all levels of society in the islands in the 60 years since World War II.

“Politicians plan for the next election; the military plans for the next generation. We need to start thinking like them.” Former Guam Congressman Robert A. Underwood

U.S. officials vehemently deny that Oceania is on the back burner these days. Department of Interior Deputy Assistant Secretary David Cohen points to the fact that President Bush met with Pacific Forum Island leaders and recently established an inter-agency group to coordinate Pacific policy matters in Washington as evidence that the region is getting attention. In addition, he says, "there has been tremendous visibility because of the Compact of Free Association (with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands). There has been a lot of attention from high level people." Schriver, too, dismisses the idea of the Pacific as a neglected backwater. "The Pacific is on the front burner," he contends. "Senior people in Washington are involved."

Still, getting attention and getting results are two different things. For the Marshall Islands, requests for funding for nuclear test compensation, nuclear clean up and medical treatment programs have languished for more than four years in Washington. This remains a pivotal, if largely ignored, issue for the Marshall Islands in its relationship with the U.S. In negotiations for amended Compacts with the FSM and Marshall Islands, despite the fact that economic projections of the islands-and even those provided by the U.S. General Accounting Office-indicated that offered U.S. funding levels for trust funds planned to replace U.S. funding in 2023 was inadequate, the U.S. government didn't budge on funding levels. A new agreement for long-term use of Kwajalein Atoll, where the U.S. pumps in billions of dollars for anti-missile defense weapons testing, has foundered over just $4 million, the merest of blips in the Pentagon's budget.

On the world stage, the low-lying islands in the region will be the first to face-some argue they are already facing-the effects of sea level rise, which poses the ultimate in "homeland security" issues for most Pacific Islands. Yet Washington under the Bush Administration has refused to endorse the Kyoto Protocol, the most significant global effort to combat climate change.

Palau President Tommy Remengesau, Jr. put it succinctly in pointing out that Washington's primary interest in its compacts with the three Micronesian governments has always been strategic. For these freely associated states, the single most important aspect of their compacts with the United States is the visa-free access to the U.S. That's why the U.S. requirement of modifying this provision in the amended compacts for the FSM and the Marshalls, and its attempt to get Palau to follow suit, rankled island leaders. Palau rejected U.S. overtures to also amend immigration provisions because unlike the FSM and Marshalls compacts, its compact doesn't expire until 2009.

Underwood believes this proves the point that island leaders need to define their roles in the world's new political and strategic environment. "If you just give a blank check and expect the U.S. to give you a blank check in return, they'll just say 'thank you' for the blank check," he says. "Island leaders need to theorize: what is the relationship with the U.S. and how do they fit in strategically? Politicians plan for the next election; the military plans for the next generation. We need to start thinking like them."

Kwajalein is arguably the most important American military installation in the Pacific Islands. Military brass frequently describe the missile testing range as unique and irreplaceable. Yet, says Underwood, "If things went wrong, the Army is prepared to move it. They don't want to, but they also have a plan. What's our plan? We say we support the United States, but we don't have a defined agenda."

The military value of Micronesia used to be defined by strategic denial. "Strategic denial hasn't been in operation since the Cold War," Underwood says. "But people still seem to think it has some life. Strategic denial is irrelevant. What's to take its place? Just giving a blank check to the U.S. won't work. It's engagement. It has to be a supportive role, but a special role."

The Interior Department's Cohen believes that links between Americans and citizens of the freely associated states forged through such bonds as military service will endure in a more profound way than the strategic importance of the islands. "The strategic importance of the region waxes and wanes," Cohen told Pacific. "It will change from year to year. But the connection between the United States and the freely associated states will endure. They are not the most powerful, but they are the closest American allies in the world."

Still, he concedes, "to the extent that the Pacific has relevance to issues that preoccupy Washington, they will get attention."

And that is precisely the point. But it doesn't necessarily mean that the Pacific has to pander to Washington's interests to get attention. Whether it is the need to establish an environment conducive to business development and partnerships, to redefine concepts of security and strategic value in relation to the U.S., or to address global issues of climate change and free trade, how engaged are the governments and leaders in the North Pacific islands? The ability to gain leverage and to generate relevance and attention in Washington, and elsewhere, comes from active engagement and agenda setting.

"The islands need to use the concept of linkage," Underwood argues. "This is important to you; this is important to us: link them and take steps accordingly. Use the strongest U.S. interest to your advantage."

Given the smallness of most of these islands, and their lack of resources and capacity, it's a daunting-but unavoidable-challenge. And it comes back to the success of the U.S. Army recruitment in Majuro. Underwood, who as interim chairman of the board of a newly established Asian Pacific Islander American Scholarship Fund that has close ties to the Gates Millennium Scholarship Fund, has been beating the bushes in the freely associated states to get islanders to take advantage of competitive college scholarships, which to date they haven't.

"If you hustle you get results," he says of American military recruiters. "Who's hustling for scholarships?"