Diplomacy In A Value Free Zone

A new paper by Australian commentator Graham Dobell for the Lowy Institute for International Policy says the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan is making Pacific politics “more corrupt and more violent.”

 

In “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific, Diplomatic Chess vs Pacific Political Rugby”, Dobell writes that checkbook diplomacy has crossed the line from buying diplomatic influence to fostering corruption.

 

He cites the targeting of Chinese-owned and run businesses in Solomon Islands’ Easter Tuesday, and Tonga’s November 16 riots of last year as a physical reaction to this political struggle.

 

And Dobell explores the implication for Australia in the region, particularly for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands which he says is “turning into a billion dollar project for Australia.”

 

“Australia’s interests, investment and the bipartisan position of the Federal Government and opposition, point to the Canberra consensus on the need to make RAMSI work. Yet the struggle between Taiwan and China cuts across those interests.”

 

Dobell says the competition between China and Taiwan in the Pacific is affecting efforts to rebuild Solomon Islands, as it has precluded the United Nations playing a direct role in RAMSI.

 

“The absence of a UN mantle is starting to hurt RAMSI. The Sogavare government is slowly slicing and strangling RAMSI, claiming it is merely reclaiming sovereignty abrogated by Australian officials. The support from the (Pacific Islands) Forum is not enough to ward off such interference by Sogavare. The lack of a UN blessing may harm the longevity or legitimacy of the mission.”

 

Dobell believes that today, any significant diplomatic discussion in the Pacific must factor in China’s wishes. And he says China “draws strength from a regional perception of a diminished United States role in the South Pacific.

 

He says the movement of ethnic Chinese into the South Pacific, development of Chinese tourism (French Polynesia has just joined the list of Pacific destinations with Approved Destination Status), and extension of trade are part of China’s “new diaspora.

 

“Australia estimates that China has more diplomats in the South Pacific than any other country…Over 3,000 Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have been registered in the Pacific region with investments of about US$620 million,” Dobell writes.

 

Dobell cites University of the South Pacific Professor Emeritus Ron Crocombe’s estimate that about 80,000 overseas Chinese are now living in the Pacific Islands region and says the breakdown looks something like:

 

Fiji, Papua New Guinea: 20,000

Northern Marianas: 15,000

French Polynesia: 14,000 (but mainly long established residents)

Guam: 4,000 (Taiwanese and Chinese)

Remainder of Micronesia: 1,500 (total)

Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia: 2,600 (total)

Polynesia: 1,400 (total)

 

Dobell writes that in comparison to Australia with its (sometimes controversial) insistence on “good governance” and accountability, China is an undemanding partner, offering no opinions on governance beyond the issue of Taiwan.

 

“Beijing can be a comfortable partner, operating a value-free foreign policy driven only by self interest. One of the apparent attractions of the new superpower is that it has no ideology to sell,” Dobell writes, pointing to the comments of Fiji coup leader Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama who said if Australia cut ties, China would provide help.

 

Of Taiwan, Dobell writes that in respect to Solomon Islands, Australian officials are quite explicit about their knowledge of how Taiwan’s embassy in Honiara gave cash to support the electoral campaigns of individual political candidates in 2006. “Taiwan’s intervention in the election was so deep that it did not stop at just backing individual candidates in specific seats. In some seats, Taipei funded two or three candidates. Some of this was insurance, but often the money was used to back ‘spoiler’ candidates to Taiwan’s preferred man could win through.”

 

He says Taiwan’s aid budget is structured to allow the fight with China to be conducted in secret. About 15 percent is distributed through transparent projects and loans. But the remainder is funneled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “and no proper accounting for this slush fund is offered. This funding ratio indicates policy priorities-85 percent of Taipei’s effort and cash goes to the never-ending fight with China for “international space”; the remaining 15 percent can be spared for what the rest of the world would classify as development assistance.”

 

That international space appears to be diminishing.

In the Pacific; Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu recognize Taiwan. But since 2000, seven countries internationally have switched their recognition to China.